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How Level is the Playing Field?
Should Employers Be Able to
Circumvent State Workers'
Compensation Schemes by Creating
Their Own Employee Compensation
Plans?
Strawn v. AFC Enterprises, d/b/a Church's Chicken'
I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes resulting from workplace incidents are consuming increasingly greater
proportions of our courts' dockets.2 In recent years, "[e]mployment litigation has
grown at a rate many times greater than litigation in general ... almost one thousand
percent greater than the increase in all other types of civil litigation combined."3
Due to the unequal bargaining power employers possess over employees in these
disputes, states have passed workers' compensation laws to level the playing field.'
However, employers have chosen not to subscribe to their states' workers'
compensation systems, but instead have created their own employee compensation
plans.' In addition, these employer-created compensation plans demand that
employees submit all their disputes to an arbitral forum.6 The Supreme Court has
not set forth a minimum threshold that employer-created compensation plans must
meet so as not to violate the public policy underlying the state workers'
compensation schemes. In Strawn, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas faced such an employer-created compensation plan and held it to
be void as against Texas public policy
1. 70 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
2. Beth M. Primm, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151 (1999).
3. Id. at 151. "Currently, there are over 25,000 wrongful discharge and discrimination cases pending
in state and federal courts nationwide." Id. See Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration vs.
Employment Litigation, DISP. RESOL. J., May 1999 ,at 78. Nearly all of these cases involve jury trials
with lengthy delays and unpredictable results. Id.
4. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401- 406 (West 1999)).
5. See, e.g., Duran v. Intex Aviation Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 1996); Cupit v. Waits, 90
F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 1996); Cline v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 730 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Strawn,
70 F. Supp. 2d at 717; Gutierrez v. Academy Corp., 967 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Brito v. Intex
Aviation Servs., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 1994 WL 803508
(N.D. Tex. 1994); Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App. 1999); Martinez v.
IBP, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1998).
6. See, e.g., Cupit, 90 F.3d at 107; Cline, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 731; Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 717;
Gutierrez, 967 F. Supp. at 945; Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508, at * 1; Martinez, 961 S.W.2d at 678.
7. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Barbara Strawn ("Strawn") was an'employee of AFC Enterprises, Inc. ("AFC"),
which was doing business as Church's Chicken in Alvin, Texas.8 Strawn alleged that
she was injured when she slipped and fell during the course and scope of her
employment with Church's Chicken on January 7, 1998.' AFC did not subscribe to
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act'o (the "Act")." Instead of offering its
employees workers' compensation insurance, AFC created its own employee
compensation plan called the America's Favorite Chicken Texas Employee Injury
Benefit Plan (the "AFC Plan").' 2 The AFC Plan offered employees limited medical,
wage-replacement and death benefits for those accidents that occurred during the
course and scope of their employment with AFC." In accordance with the AFC
Plan, AFC paid Strawn $22,500 in wage-replacement and approximately $24,000 in
medical benefits to compensate her for her slip and fall injuries. 4
Along with the AFC Plan, AFC also required each prospective employee to sign
its Value Deal Agreement as a condition precedent to employment. 5 The Value
Deal Agreement stated that "all claims and disputes Employee may presently have
or may in the future have" against AFC, particularly including "claims for bodily
injury or physical, mental or psychological injury," must be submitted to binding
arbitration.1 6 The Value Deal Agreement and the AFC Plan worked together to
provide employees greater benefits if they agreed to submit claims to an arbitral
forum and waive their statutory or common law causes of action." On August 14,
1997, Strawn signed AFC's Value Deal Agreement in order to become an
employee. 8 Contrary to her commitment under the Value Deal Agreement, Strawn
filed suit against AFC in Texas district court seeking redress for her injuries. 9
Strawn claimed that the AFC Plan and the Value Deal Agreement were unilaterally
imposed by AFC and effectively forced employees to waive their statutory or
common law causes of action in favor of an arbitral forum. ° Strawn did concede
8. Id. at 719.
9. Id.
10. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401- 406 (West 1999).
11. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
12. Id.
13. Id. The difference in the amount of benefits provided under the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act (the "Act") as compared to AFC's Plan is considerable. Under the Act, employees received lifetime
medical benefits, a percentage of their wages calculated in relation to the nature of their medical
impairment, up to 75% of their pre-injury wage for extreme injuries, and lifetime benefits if the
employee is killed in the course of employment. Id. Under AFC's Plan, an employee received only 26
weeks of benefits, or 104 weeks of benefits, if they signed a Value Deal Agreement; no percentage of
their wages pro-rated to fit the nature of their medical impairment; no pre-injury wages; and no death
benefits unless the employee signed a Value Deal Agreement, and then the employee only got a
maximum of twice their pre-injury annual pay not in excess of $75,000. Id. at 719-20.
14. Id. at 719.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Strawn, 70 F. Supp 2d at 719.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 722.
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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that it was permissible for an employer to offer benefits equaling Texas workers'
compensation benefits while requiring employees to waive their statutory and
common law causes of action.2 1 However, Strawn argued that the AFC Plan
impermissibly offered benefits considerably lower than those of the Texas workers'
compensation system, and it also required employees to waive their statutory and
common law causes of action because of the Value Deal Agreement. 22 For these
reasons, Strawn claimed the AFC Plan and Value Deal Agreement were void as
against Texas public policy.23
AFC countered by filing a Motion to Stay or Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Ace4 ("FAA"). 25 AFC conceded that its
employment benefits were inferior to those of the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act; however, AFC argued that the AFC Plan was consistent with Texas public
policy because it offered limited benefits without regard to fault.26 Additionally,
AFC claimed that it "could have unilaterally imposed the Value Deal Agreement on
its employees as a condition of employment without offering any benefits
whatsoever. 27
Ultimately, the Texas district court denied AFC's Motion to Stay or Dismiss the
case and to Compel Arbitration. 28 The court held that it violated Texas workers'
compensation public policy for employers to offer low-level benefits to their
employees and to unilaterally impose an arbitral forum in which the injured
employee must seek redress. 29 The court stated that an arbitral forum is "sufficiently
dissimilar" to a judicial forum.30 Therefore, the court found AFC's Value Deal
Agreement void as against Texas public policy because it forced AFC employees to
resolve their disputes in unsatisfactory arbitral forums while providing only limited
benefits."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Texas Workers' Compensation Act was passed in response to the unequal
bargaining power possessed by an employer defending against tort actions brought
by employees injured in the course and scope of their employment.32 The Act
attempted to level the playing field between employers and employees in workplace
injury actions by guaranteeing those injured employees, who worked for subscribing
employers, limited benefits without having to prove fault.3 At the same time, the




24. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1994).
25. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
26. Id. at 720.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 719.
29. Id. at 725-26.
30. Id. at 725. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 726.
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large tort judgments by requiring employees to waive any statutory or common law
causes of action against the employer.14 Although such a scheme appears to render
an effective trade-off, numerous employers have chosen not to subscribe to the Act
and to take their chances in defending the tort actions brought by injured
employees.35 The Act was passed primarily to safeguard injured employees from
powerful employers and to encourage employers' cooperation; the Act prevents non-
subscribing employers from using any previously available common law defenses.36
Because such defenses are no longer available to non-subscribing employers in tort
actions, the possibility of excessive liability increases, which provides the incentive
to subscribe to the Act.37 For those employers who opt not to subscribe, many
develop alternative plans designed to serve similar functions.3" These alternative
plans often include provisions mandating that employer-employee disputes be
submitted to arbitration. 9
The FAA was enacted by Congress in 1925 in order to dispell the common law
notion that arbitration provisions were against public policy and thus, deemed
unenforceable.' Under the FAA, if parties decide by written agreement to arbitrate
their disputes, courts will stay judicial proceedings until such arbitration has
transpired."' This deference by courts to an agreed upon arbitration provision
reflects the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 42  Because of this strong
federal policy, employers have increasingly included arbitration provisions in their
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1994); J. Garcia v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 1999 WL 362787 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Greenhill v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 886
F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Pyle v. Beverly Enters.-Texas, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1993);
Texas Mexican Ry. v. P. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1998); Lawrence v. CDB Servs.,16 S.W.3d 35
(Tex. App. 2000); Whole Foods Market Southwest, L.P. v. Tijerina, 979 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1998).
36. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Hazelwood v. Mandrell Indus., 596 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex.
App. 1980).
37. Id.
38. See cases cited supra note 5.
39. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
40. Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect Upon the Federal
Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 35-37 (1997).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) and Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("The Arbitration Act thus establishes a federal policy favoring
arbitration, requiring that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.")) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26
(1985).
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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employment agreements obligating employees to submit all disputes with the
employer to binding arbitration."
A recently litigated issue surrounding the Act, in conjunction with the FAA,
concerns non-subscribing employers who choose to create and offer their own
voluntary employee compensation plans." These employer-created plans often
require employees to waive their statutory and common law causes of action and
agree to submit all disputes to an arbitral forum.45 In addition, the plans usually limit
the employees' monetary benefits.' Because no real guidelines exist to govern these
employer-created compensation plans, many employers have been able to frustrate
the intent of the Act by using such plans to require all prospective employees to give
up their statutory and common law causes of action in exchange for limited benefits
(often times, lower than those offered under the Act).4 7 Moreover, the plans often
force injured employees to seek redress in an arbitral forum.4 ' Employees have been
seeking to invalidate employer-created plans, which limit their rights, by claiming
that these plans violate public policy.49 Typically, courts facing this public policy
challenge have compared the level of benefits provided by the employer's plan to
those offered under the Act and have held valid those plans offering benefits equal
to or greater than those under the Act.?0 Alternatively, plans offering fewer benefits
than the Act have been held invalid.51 The United States Supreme Court has yet to
decide whether non-subscribing employers can create compensation plans offering
limited benefits, such as requiring employees to submit all disputes to an arbitral
forum, without "thwarting the intent of the (state] Legislature."'5 2
A. Case Law Supporting Employer-Created Substitutes for Workers'
Compensation Plans
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found a collective bargaining agreement
between an employee and a non-subscribing employer to be valid in Cupit v. Walts.53
In Cupit, the plaintiff claimed the collective bargaining agreement was void as
against public policy because it "create[d] an unregulated self-insuring scheme."
However, the court declared that employers had a right to decide whether they were
going to subscribe to the Act.55 The court further stated, "[a]n agreement between
a non-subscribing employer and its employees whereby the non-subscribing
employer contractually obligates itself to provide benefits to its employees equal to
43. See Cupit, 90 F.3d at 107; Cline, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 731; Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 717; Gutierrez,
967 F. Supp. at 945; Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508, at *1; Martinez, 961 S.W.2d at 678.
44. See cases cited supra note 5.
45. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 43.
46. See cases cited supra note 43.
47. See cases cited supra note 43.
48. See cases cited supra note 43.
49. See cases cited supra note 43.
50. See cases cited supra note 43.
51. See cases cited supra note 43.
52. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
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or greater than those provided under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act is a
valid and enforceable contract.
5 6
The Texas court of appeals in Amarillo also considered the enforceability of a
non-subscribing employer's substitute plan in Lambert v. Affiliated Foods, Inc. 7
Affiliated Foods, Inc. ("Affiliated") elected not to subscribe to the Act but instead
offered its employees the "Affiliated Foods, Inc. Employee Disability Benefit Plan"
("AFI Plan") under which Lambert elected to participate." Specifically, the AFI
Plan provided employees with no-fault coverage for occupational as well as non-
occupational injuries in exchange for a waiver of any and all common law causes of
action against Affiliated.5 9 Lambert was injured during the course and scope of his
employment and he received his scheduled benefits of $57,698.32 under the AFI
Plan.60 Nevertheless, Lambert filed suit alleging that the waiver in the AFI Plan was
void as against Texas public policy because the benefits were not "equivalent" to the
benefits provided by the Act.6t The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Affiliated but failed to detail the rationale upon which the court reached its
decision.62
The court of appeals in Amarillo affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
finding that "public policy [does] not invalidate the employee's election and
waiver., 63 The court looked to the Act itself and specifically noted that the Act did
not include the defense of waiver in its list of barred common law defenses under §
406.033(a). 64 The court stated that it was for the legislature to set forth policy
decisions and since the Act did not specifically state that waiving rights to sue for
injuries was an impermissible defense, waivers could not be deemed void as against
public policy. 65 The court further declared that the AFI Plan was not a condition to
Lambert's employment, but rather was voluntarily entered into by Lambert and
provided more expansive coverage than the Act.66 Finally, the court discussed Reyes
v. Storage & Processors, Inc. ,67 and declined to follow its rationale, stating that
Reyes was not binding authority upon the court.68
The Amarillo court of appeals again upheld the validity of a self-created
employee compensation agreement against a public policy challenge in Lawrence
v. CDB Services, Inc.69 When Gary Lawrence was hired as an employee by CDB
Services, Inc., ("CDB"), a non-subscribing employer, he voluntarily elected to
56. Id.
57. 20 S.W.3d I (Tex. App. 1999).
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a) (West 1996)). "The Act provides that (i)
contributory negligence, (ii) assumed risk, or (iii) injury caused by the negligence of a fellow employee
are not defenses to an action." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6-7.
67. 995 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App. 1999).
68. Lambert, 20 S.W.3d at 7.
69. 16 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App. 2000).
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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participate in CDB's Employee Benefit Plan and Trust (the "CDB Plan").70 The
CDB Plan provided that Lawrence would give up any common law right to sue CDB
and his only remedy for injuries sustained on the job were those offered by the CDB
Plan." Lawrence was injured during the course of his employment when his
bulldozer flipped; he was issued benefits under the CDB Plan in excess of $200,000
for the first three and a half years after his injury.72 Lawrence filed suit against CDB
claiming that the CDB Plan was void as against Texas public policy because the
agreement was executed prior to his injuries and the CDB Plan did not afford
"equivalent" benefits as conferred by the Act. 3 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of CDB7
The court of appeals went into a lengthy discussion, distinguished prior cases
and finally noted that although these agreements have the effect of shifting or
releasing a party from "responsibility for future acts of negligence," they do not
violate public policy.75 The court then looked to the Act for guidance and declared
the public policy stated in the Act: "in Texas an employee can waive specified
common law rights in exchange for some level of fixed benefits to be provided
without regard to fault in the event of an injury on the job., 76 Additionally, as in
Lambert, the court looked at the specific sections of the Act and stated that some
defenses are specifically declared void or prohibited by the statute. However, the
court said, "we find no part of the Workers' Compensation Act by which the
Legislature has expressly nullified, or even limited the scope of, a [substitute]
agreement ... merely because it was executed prior to the employee's injury. ,7
Therefore, the court concluded that the Act did not "expressly nor impliedly" set
forth a public policy which would govem the enforceability of the CDB Plan. 79 The
trial court's summary judgment in favor of CDB was affirmed.50
Finally, in Cline v. HE. Butt Grocery Co., 1 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas also upheld the validity of a non-subscribing
employer's occupational benefit plan which required employees to submit all
disputes with the employer to arbitration.12 In Cline, the non-subscribing employer
created HEB's SMART Work Injury Benefit Plan (the "SMART Plan"), which
allowed an employee to choose between "Basic coverage" or "Comprehensive
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 38.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 39-41. See Green Int'l., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1997); Dresser Indus., Inc. v.
Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993); Crowell v. Housing Auth. of City of Dallas, 495
S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); Barnhart v. Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co. of Texas, 184 S.W. 176 (Tex. 1916);
Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 722; Texas Health Enters. v. Kirkgard, 882 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App. 1994).
76. Lawrence, 16 S.W.3d at 41-42.
77. Id. at 42.
78. Id. at 44.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 45.
81. 79 F. Supp. 2d 730.
82. Id. at 731.
2000]
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coverage."83 The court declared that in determining whether a grievance is subject
to arbitration, "[f]irst, the Court asks whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate;
if so, the Court then asks whether the issue in question is covered by the valid
agreement."" The Texas district court found a valid agreement to arbitrate was
present "because it is a contractual provision supported by consideration and there
are no equitable reasons to invalidate this private contractual agreement to
arbitrate."" Consequently, the court submitted all arbitrable claims to arbitration.86
The court in Cline also distinguished its holding from that in Strawn v. AFC
Enterprises,7 which was decided by the same court a month and a half prior to
Cline.88 The court explained that the non-subscribing employer's agreement in
Strawn functioned as a condition precedent to employment and "that forcing a
worker to waive her right to sue in exchange for miserly benefits was contrary to the
public policy of Texas by undermining the 'quid pro quo' exchange between
employer and employee envisioned by the Texas Legislature when it enacted the
Workers' Compensation system."' 9  However, the court stated that the non-
subscribing employer's agreement in Cline was completely voluntary, did not offer
benefits inferior to those offered under the Act and was written in such plain
language that all employees would be able to discem their rights from reading the
text of the agreement.9° Based on these differences, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas held Strawn distinguishable from Cline and upheld
the validity of the SMART Plan offered by H.E. Butt Grocery Co. against Cline's
public policy challenge.9'
B. Case Law Invalidating Employer-Created Substitutes for Workers'
Compensation Plans
The Texas court of appeals in Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc.,92 held
defendant's Occupational Accident Employee Welfare Benefit Plan's (the "Benefit
Plan") requirement that employees "waive any and all other causes of action, claims,
rights, and demands" void and unenforceable because it violated the Texas
Legislature's intent underlying the Act.93 Ramon Reyes was employed as a forklift
operator by Storage and Processors, Inc. ("Storage"), and upon his employment, he
83. Id. According to the SMART Plan, if the employee elects "Basic coverage," then he retains his
right to sue for injuries arising in the scope and course of employment; whereas, if the employee chooses
the "Comprehensive coverage," he waives his right to sue for an increased amount of benefits and further
agrees to submit all claims to binding arbitration. Id. The plaintiff chose the latter coverage and
therefore agreed to submit all claims into binding arbitration, waiving his right to sue. Id.
84. Id. at 732 (quoting Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1996)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 735.
87. 70 F. Supp. 2d at 717.




92. 995 S.W.2d 722.
93. Id. at 724.
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agreed to participate in the Benefit Plan.94 The Benefit Plan was an employee
compensation plan created by Storage because it did not subscribe to the Act;
however, the Benefit Plan offered lower benefits to injured employees than the Act.9
After about eighteen months on the job, Reyes' foot was run over by a forklift.' He
received $89,891.69 in medical benefits and $16,842.86 in wage replacement
benefits under the Benefit Plan over the eighteen month period following his
injury.97 Contrary to the terms of the Benefit Plan, Reyes also brought a negligence
suit against Storage, which Storage sought to dismiss.9" The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Storage, and Reyes appealed. 99
The court began its discussion by briefly tracing the history of the Act and by
setting forth the relevant portions of the current Act. 10 The court went on to explain
the rights and obligations of non-subscribing employers 10 The court said that it was
permissible for a non-subscribing employer to offer benefits "equal to or greater"
than those provided under the Act.'02 However, "public policy does not permit an
employer to reap the principal benefits of providing workers' compensation
coverage - the waiver of an injured employee's common law and statutory claims
- without also bestowing on the injured employee the principal benefit for which
that waiver is the 'quid quo pro'- the limited but certain benefits guaranteed by
workers' compensation insurance coverage."'0 3 "If the 'balance' between the extent
of the waiver and the receipt of benefits is tipped so that the employee's benefits
under the statute are substantially reduced, the clear intent of the legislature is
thwarted."' 4 Under this rationale, the court compared the benefits offered by the
Storage Benefit Plan to the benefits under the Act and concluded that the Benefit
Plan violated Texas public policy, and therefore, Reyes' waiver of his rights to sue
were void and unenforceable.'0 5
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas followed this






99. Id. at 724-25.
100. Id. at 726-27. The Employers' Liability Act was passed in 1913, which allowed "employees
injured in the course and scope of their employment [to] waive their common law and statutory causes
of action in exchange for the ability to receive more limited benefits 'without the necessity of proving
negligence and without regard to the employer's potential defenses."' Id. at 726 (quoting Texas
Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 521 (Tex. 1995)).
101. Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 727. "As a general rule, if an employer chooses non-subscriber status,
'[v]oluntary work[er]'s compensation is purely a matter of contract and the rights and obligations of the
parties are measured by the contract."' Id. (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Valdez, 390
S.W.2d 485,489 (Tex. App. 1965).
102. Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 728.
103. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 596 S.W.2d at 206).
104. Id. at 728 (quoting Hazelwood, 596 S.W.2d at 206).
105. Id. at 729. The Storage Occupational Accident Employee Welfare Benefit Plan provided 104
weeks of medical benefits, no impairment or long-term wage replacement benefits and the lesser amount
of $500,000 or ten times the employee's base salary for death benefits. Id. at 728. The Act provides
lifetime medical benefits, impairment benefits, long-term wage replacement benefits and death benefits
at the same rate as lifetime benefits are calculated. Id.
2000]
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public policy because it offered employees fewer benefits than would be available




In the instant case, the court found it had jurisdiction over the original suit based
on diversity of citizenship.' 7 The court began by setting forth the two-step Webb'08
analytical standard upon which motions to compel arbitration under the FAA are to
be evaluated.' 9 The first step actually contains two separate inquiries that a court
must make: "(a) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question, and
(b) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of the agreement to
arbitrate."" 0. The second step a court must take under the Webb analysis is to decide
"whether legal constraints external to the parties['] agreement foreclosed the
arbitration of those claims.""'
The court stated that when looking at the two subparts of the first step in the
Webb analysis, the presumption went in favor of compelling arbitration.' 1 2 First,
arbitration agreements are supported by strong federal policy and as a result of this
policy, courts usually compel arbitration under step I(b)."3 Second, under step 1(a),
the presumption also leans in favor of compelling arbitration because parties have
the ability to assent to arbitrate a large variety of disputes." 4  The court
acknowledged that parties could even agree to arbitrate statutory rights because of
the broad types of disputes arbitrated." 5 As a result of this strong federal policy
supporting arbitration agreements, courts now submit disputes concerning the
enforceability of an arbitration clause to an arbitrator, instead of deciding the
question themselves." 6 The court explained that this broad discretion granted to
arbitrators has also stemmed from the Prima Paint"7 rule that when a complaint
attacks the validity of a contract as a whole, enforceability issues surrounding the
arbitration clause are decided by an arbitrator."' However, if a party bases an attack
106. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
107. See id. at 719.
108. Webb, 89 F.3d 252.
109. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
110. Id. (citing Webb, 89 F.3d at 257-58).
111. Id. at 720. (citing Webb, 89 F.3d at 257-58). See also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628
(1985).
112. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
113. Id. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
475-76 (1989)). See Webb, 89 F.3d at 258.
114. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
115. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). The district court
based its conclusion that statutory rights may also be arbitrable on the premise that, "by agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors,
473 U.S. at 628).
116. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
117. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
118. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04).
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on the enforceability of the arbitration clause in isolation, courts can properly resolve
this issue." 9
The court cautioned that while federal policy favors arbitration, the FAA puts
limits on the enforceability of arbitration agreements based on defenses to the
formation of contracts. 20 According to § 2 of the FAA, arbitration agreements are
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."'' The court noted that it is the second
step of the Webb analysis that incorporates the invalidation of arbitration agreements
under § 2 of the FAA by considering "legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement."' 22 Under this second step, a party can set forth more broad-based,
theoretical arguments as to why the arbitration agreement should be invalidated.'
2 3
The court commented that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening [the FAA].' 24
After setting forth the analytical framework, the court considered the various
arguments and positions of the parties. 125  AFC bolstered the validity and
enforceability of its Value Agreement by relying on case law precedent.' 26 AFC
claimed that the case law upheld the right of an employee to completely waive any
statutory or common law right to sue. 27 On this basis, AFC argued that its Value
Deal Agreement was less restrictive because it did not require employees to
completely waive their right to sue, but rather permitted them to accept the benefits
of the AFC Plan and also allowed them to sue in tort in an arbitral forum. 2 8 AFC
argued that just because the employee had to sue in an arbitral forum pursuant to
their agreement, rather than in a judicial forum, should not make the agreement
automatically unenforceable. 29 Parties to a contract have the option of completely
119. Id. The court gave the following example to clarify the Prima Paint rule: "[I]f a party claims
that the signature on an employment contract was obtained by fraud, the enforceability of an arbitration
clause found within that employment contract is to be decided by the arbitrator, because the attack goes
to the contract as a whole." Id. at 720-21. "But if the complaint is that the arbitration clause itself was
obtained by fraud, then it is for a court, and not an arbitrator, to decide on the enforceability of the
arbitration provision." Id. at 721 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04).
120. Id. at 721.
121. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999)). Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
122. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (citing Webb, 89 F.3d at 257-58).
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Doctor's Assocs, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
125. Id.
126. Id. See, e.g., Duran, 98 F.3d 1339; Cupit, 90 F.3d 107; Gutierrez, 967 F. Supp. 945; Brito, 879
F. Supp. 650; Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508; Martinez, S.W.2d 678.
127. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22.
128. Id. at 722.
129. Id. See cases cited supra note 43.
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waiving their right to sue without the contract being deemed per se unenforceable. 3
Alternatively, AFC claimed that even if the court found the Value Deal Agreement
voidable, Strawn ratified the agreement by accepting $47,000 in benefits. 3' Finally,
AFC claimed that the dispute surrounding the enforceability of the Value Deal
Agreement should be decided by an arbitrator, not by the court.'32
Strawn on the other hand, argued that unilaterally forcing employees to waive
their statutory and common law right to sue in favor of arbitration, while also
providing only feeble benefits when compared to the Act, was void as against Texas
public policy.' While Strawn did not argue that AFC had the right to require
employees to waive their right to sue so long as they offered comparable benefits to
the workers' compensation system, the problem arose when AFC imposed the
combination of inferior benefits and required employees to waive their right to sue
in a judicial forum." Strawn cited two cases in support of her argument.'
The court then addressed the parties' arguments in the context of discussing the
public policy underlying the Act.'36 The court found that AFC's Plan satisfied both
subparts of the first prong of the Webb analysis, but it failed to satisfy the second
prong because it was "void as contrary to Texas public policy with respect to the
workers' compensation system."'' The court explained that the Texas legislature
passed the Act to mitigate the perceived injustices of the old common law system. 38
Subscribers to the Act were provided a trade-off: employers avoided the risk of
paying large judgments and employees were guaranteed a set amount of benefits,
without having to prove fault.' 39 While subscribing to the Act is not mandatory in
Texas, the penalty imposed for not subscribing is the loss of the above mentioned
common law defenses, which makes the possibility of liability more probable."t
The Act was seen by the legislature as a trade-off between the employee and
employer, but "primarily for the benefit and protection of employees.'' Based
upon the aforementioned reasons, the Texas court of appeals held void, as against
public policy, an employee's waiver of common law and statutory claims for
benefits below those provided by the workers' compensation system.
42
130. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 722. See cases cited supra note 43.




135. Id. See Cupit, 90 F.3d at 107; See also Reyes, 995 S.W.2d 722.
136. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 723. Under the old common law scheme, employees that were injured in the course and
scope of their employment could sue their employer in tort and recover if they proved their injury was
proximately caused by the employer. Id. (citing Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 521. Under this scheme,
however, employers usually avoided liability because they could invoke numerous defenses, such as
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. Id.
139. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 521). See also Reyes, 995 S.W.2d
at 726.
140. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 521). See also Reyes, 995 S.W.2d
at 726.
141. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (quoting Hazelwood, 596 S.W.2d at 206).
142. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 727-28). See supra text
accompanying note 103. Also, the benefits offered in Reyes were higher than those offered to Strawn
under the AFC Plan. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
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AFC claimed that the law allowed them to make all employees waive their
common law and statutory claims as a condition to gaining employment, while
offering them no benefits whatsoever.'43 The court disposed of this argument by
saying that "[s]uch a one-sided arrangement would be contrary to Texas public
policy with regard to worker's compensation coverage, because it undermines the
proper 'quid pro quo' exchange envisioned by the legislature."'" Furthermore, the
court said that the only way an employer could exchange benefits far below those
of the workers' compensation system, for an agreement to arbitrate, was if the
arbitral forum did not frustrate the Texas legislature's desired "quid pro quo" which
exists when an employee seeks a remedy in a judicial forum. 14 If the arbitral forum
does not rise to the level of the "quid pro quo exchange," then it should be
considered void as violating Texas public policy.'" This narrowed the court's focus
to deciding whether an arbitral forum was similar enough to a judicial forum so as
not to frustrate the legislative intent of the Act. 1
47
The court held that an arbitral forum was not similar enough to the judicial
forum the Texas legislature had in mind, and therefore, the legislative intent behind
the passing of the Act was undermined.' 41 The court set forth numerous reasons why
an arbitral forum was not similar enough to a judicial forum. 149 First, arbitral forums
do not allow claims to be heard by a jury, which directly contravenes the Act's
theory of crippling an employer by restricting their use of common law defenses in
an employee tort action. 50 Second, arbitral forums do not strictly adhere to the rules
of evidence like judicial forums.' Third, there is a large discrepancy in the legal
expertise necessary to become a judge as compared to an arbitrator.'52 After listing
these differences, the court concluded that:
stripping a defendant of common law defenses is not much of a
disincentive in practice if the rules of evidence employed in the forum fail
to properly protect an injured employee's chances for recovery, or if the
legal expertise of those conducting the proceedings are not adequate to
allow the employee to vindicate the technical legal advantages the Texas




144. Id. at 723-24.





150. Id. The major way in which the Act attempted to keep employers subscribing was to cripple the
non-subscribing employers by taking away all of their common law defenses, therefore, exposing them
to the increased probability of liability when an injured employee sued them in ajudicial forum. Id. The
court further stated that "[iln considering whether a contract is contrary to public policy, the test is
whether the tendency of the agreement is injurious to the public good, not whether its application in a
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This rationale led the court to conclude that, while people are free to choose the
forum for dispute resolution, a non-subscribing employer cannot require employees
to submit their disputes to arbitral forums while guaranteeing only limited benefits.' 5
This would subvert the legislative intent of the Act.'55
Finally, the court discussed the narrow scope of judicial review regarding
arbitral decisions under the FAA.'" The Fifth Circuit has declined to formulate non-
statutory grounds which would increase the scope of judicial review regarding
arbitration awards, as is the practice in some states. 5 7 Due to this lack of judicial
review regarding arbitral awards, the court concluded that allowing employers to
force their employees into arbitral forums, when the legislature clearly expected
some type of appellate review, was contrary to the public policy of the Act.'58 For
all the above reasons, the court held that "where employers offer minimal benefits
and unilaterally impose an arbitral forum on their injured employees, such a forum
is sufficiently dissimilar to a judicial forum as to undermine Texas public policy with
respect to the workers' compensation system."'59 Based on this holding, the court
invalidated AFC's "Value Deal Agreement" because it violated Texas public
policy. 60
The final section of the court's opinion discussed AFC's arguments and the
reasons for their failure.' 6' The court addressed each of the cases that AFC cited in
support of its arguments and found them all inapplicable or merely persuasive
authority.'62 The court then addressed AFC's other miscellaneous arguments.
63
After considering AFC's arguments, the court determined that they did not alter its
154. Id. at 725.
155. Id. "Mhe results of arbitration by private and untrained 'judges' are distantly remote from the
fair process procedurally followed and application of principled law found in the judicial process." Id.
(quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th Cir. 1986)).
156. Id.. Interpretive and application mistakes of the law do not constitute sufficient grounds to
vacate awards granted by an arbitral forum. Id. (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). Furthermore, arbitration awards are seldom vacated by courts. Id.
157. Id. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1986).
158. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
159. Id. at 725-26.
160. Id. at 726.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 726-728. First, the court distinguished the holding of Cupit v. Waits from its holding in
Strawn, stating that Cupit's holding was limited to cases where the non-subscribing employers offered
equal or greater employee benefits when compared to the Act. Id. at 726 (citing Cupit, 90 F.3d 107).
Next, the court stated that Duran v. Intex Aviation Servs., Inc. was of little help because that case failed
to rule on the waiver issue because it was never raised. Id. (citing Duran, 98 F.3d 1339). The court then
distinguished one of its own opinions, Gutierrez v. Academy Corp., by stating that the issue of public
policy was never addressed because no personal injuries were involved. Id. (citing Gutierrez, 967 F.
Supp. 945). The court announced that Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co. and Brito v. Intex Aviation Servs., Inc.
were merely persuasive authority and declined to follow them. Id. (citing Brito, 879 F. Supp. 650 and
Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508). Martinez v. IBP, Inc., was the final case that AFC cited as authority,
which the court explained was inapplicable because the disputed agreement was entered into after the
employee had already been injured. Id. at 726-727. (citing Martinez, 961 S.W.2d 678).
163. Id. at 727.
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view on the unenforceability of the Value Deal Agreement."6 The court denied
AFC's Motion to Stay or Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration and ordered each party
to pay their own costs and fees.
165
As this issue continues to be litigated, the United States Supreme Court will
likely be faced with the question of whether employer-created worker compensation
plans, which allow employers to restrict the rights of prospective employees below
those granted by the Act, violate the public policy of the workers' compensation
scheme. When the Supreme Court finally addresses this issue, the rationale of
Strawn will provide a solid analysis upon which the Supreme Court may rely.'6
164. Id. at 727-728. AFC's ratification argument had no merit because the Value Deal Agreement
was found to be void, not voidable. Id. (citing Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998)).
Voidable contracts can be ratified, but void contracts cannot. Id. AFC also tried to argue that an
arbitrator should decide whether the Value Deal Agreement was enforceable because Strawn failed to
separately attack the arbitration portion. Id. at 727. The court declared that Prima Paint was not
applicable to the second step of the Webb analysis. Id. (citing R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, 960
F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1992)). The court further addressed this argument as if the Prima Paint rule did
apply to the second step and concluded that Strawn attacked the Value Deal Agreement separately so
that a court was the proper forum in which to address the Texas public policy issue. Id. Lastly, the court
stated that its holding did not violate the FAA by treating arbitration clauses differently than ordinary
contracts. Id. at 727-28. The FAA provides that it is unlawful for any state's laws to put arbitration
clauses on "lesser footing" when compared to other contracts. Id. at 727. Therefore, the FAA is held
to preempt contrary state law which has a discriminatory effect on arbitration agreements. Id. However,
this issue was not raised by AFC. Id. at 728.
165. Id.
166. See Id. at 717-28.
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V. COMMENT
Several states have sought to put powerful employers and their employees on
a more level playing field by enacting workers' compensation systems to govern
workplace injuries. 6 7 Under most of these schemes, employees are guaranteed
certain levels of compensation for particular injuries, while employers are assured
that injured employees will not seek further tort actions that could potentially result
in excessive employer liability. 68 However, many employers have attempted to
circumvent the legislative intent underlying these schemes by choosing not to
subscribe to the workers' compensation system and instead, creating their own
employee compensation plans. 69 Such employer-created compensation plans vary
broadly in their terms as to the rights given up by employees and the guaranteed
level of benefits offered by the employer. Furthermore, many of these unregulated
plans are imposed as mandatory conditions of employment and often require
prospective employees to agree to submit all disputes to an arbitral forum. 70
In Strawn, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
found AFC's Value Deal Agreement void as against Texas public policy because it
offered employees lower benefits than available under the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act and also because it limited the employees' right to. seek redress
only to an arbitral forum.' 7 The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide the
validity and enforceability of such non-subscribing employer plans or set forth the
minimum requirements so that such plans do not undermine the intent of the states'
workers' compensation schemes. As illustrated in Strawn, the trend among lower
courts considering the validity of such employer-created compensation plans is to
compare the benefits offered by the non-subscribing employer's plan to those
available under the state's workers' compensation system and any other rights that
are restricted by the non-subscribing employer's plan.
72
The enforcement of these employer-created compensation plans revolves around
the basic law of contracts. The general rule is that contracts which are voluntarily
entered into by parties to an "arms-length" transaction should be upheld as valid,
without considering the equities of the outcome."' Exceptions to this general rule
exist when the contract appears to be unconscionable or a contract of adhesion.' 74
The usual test to determine whether a contract is unconscionable is "whether under
167. See, e.g., State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1993); Masters v. State,
668 P.2d 73, 76 (Idaho 1982); Ramsey v. Morrison, 676 N.E.2d 1304, 1310 (111. 997); Philip Elec.
North America v. Wright, 703 A.2d 150 (Md. 1997); Kenny v. AAA Delivery Serv., 216 N.W.2d 760,
762 (Mich. 1974); Ives v. Sunfish Sign Co. 275 N.W.2d 41,43 (Minn. 1979).
168. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 723. Plaintiffs win about 70% of employment litigation suits, with
an average jury award of about $700,000. Spelfogel, supra note 3, at 78.
169. See cases cited supra note 5.
170. See cases cited supra note 6.
171. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
172. See, e.g., Cupit, 90 F.3d at 107; Cline, 79 F. Supp. 2d 730 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Strawn, 70 F. Supp.
2d at 717; Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 722.
173. Hotze v. Schlanser, 102 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (III. 1951). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 79(b)cmt. c (1978).
174. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1978).
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circumstances existing at [the] time of making of [the] contract and in light of
general commercial background and commercial needs of a particular trade or case,
clauses involved are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise a party."17 5 For
contracts of adhesion:
A lack of voluntariness is demonstrated in contracts of adhesion when
there is a great imbalance in the parties' relative bargaining power, the
stronger party's terms are unnegotiable, and the weaker party is prevented
by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to contract
with another party on more favorable terms, or to refrain from contracting
at all.
76
"[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a
commercially unreasonable contract, with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was
ever given to all the terms."
177
With these basic contract principles in mind, the Value Deal Agreement in
Strawn does not appear to be unconscionable or a contract of adhesion.77 There are
no facts to suggest that Strawn did not have knowledge of the arbitration provision
or the limited benefits offered under the AFC Plan. As a matter of fact, Strawn
argued that the arbitration agreement was mandatory as a condition of employment
that was unilaterally imposed by AFC.17 Further, the agreement contained the
following plain language: "'[A]ll claims and disputes Employee may presently have
or may in the future have' against Defendant [AFC], expressly including 'claims for
bodily injury or physical, mental or psychological injury' must be submitted to
binding arbitration."' is There are no facts suggesting that Strawn was limited to
employment with AFC or that there were time restrictions on how long she had to
read the AFC Plan. 8 ' Nothing prevented Strawn from seeking the advice of outside
legal counsel regarding the AFC Plan.8 2 Finally, just because an agreement contains
an arbitral provision does not make it per se unconscionable." Thus, on its face, the
AFC Plan should have been enforced according to the general rule that voluntarily
entered contracts are valid.
The use of arbitration provisions by employers to govern disputes with their
employees have become increasingly popular with both employers and employees.'"
According to a survey of employees, eighty-three percent of American workers favor
the use of arbitration. Most employees surveyed felt that arbitration would make it
175. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191,201 (1969)).
176. Bank of Indiana, Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
177. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
178. See Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d 717.
179. Id. at 719.
180. Id.
181. See Id. 717.
182. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d 717.
183. See Diamond, supra note 40.
184. Evan J. Spelfogel, Pre-Dispute ADR Agreements Can Protect Rights of Parties and Reduce
Burden on Judicial System, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 16.
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easier for ordinary workers to obtain a speedy and fair hearing and that it would be
far less costly than hiring a lawyer and going into court.'
On the other hand, employers have declared "a mandatory arbitration program
speeds up the dispute resolution process, minimizes the expense of discovery,
reduces internal and legal costs, ensures the preservation of confidentiality (thereby
minimizing the risks of adverse publicity), and avoids the possibility of runaway jury
verdicts."'6 These studies indicate that both sides (employers and employees) find
advantages to submitting their claims to binding arbitration and that the judicial
system would frustrate this effective, increasingly popular tool for resolving disputes
if such arbitration provisions were presumed invalid. Moreover, if agreements are
made by informed parties who choose to submit their disputes to binding arbitration
and the court does not enforce such agreements, then the burden will fall on an
already clogged judicial system to remedy the situation. '1 Finally, those who argue
that mandatory arbitration provisions will adversely affect low-income employees
(usually the ones with the least bargaining power) have failed to consider how
difficult it is for such employees to gain access to the judicial process. ' Due to the
fact that "low salaries make large damage awards unlikely," it is very difficult for
these individuals to secure "resourceful, competent attorneys" to represent them in
court. 9 Realistically, fewer injured employees recover anything from their
employers. Under our judicial process, this is truly the unjust result.
In Strawn, the resolution of the dispute revolved not around the presence of the
mandatory arbitration provision, but around the level of benefits that the AFC Plan
provided as compared to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act."9 While the court
used the fact that AFC "unilaterally impose[d] an arbitral forum on their injured
employees" as a factor, this was not the pivotal consideration.' 9' Rather, the
consensus seems to be that those employer-created compensation plans offering
"benefits to its employees equal to or greater than those provided under the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act [or any state workers' compensation system]" are
enforceable as contracts."9 However, where such plans extend benefits that "while,
certain, are far more limited than those provided by [state] workers' compensation"
systems, courts will deem these plans to contravene the legislatures' intent in passing
the workers' compensation laws and will find them void as against public policy.'
93
This is an example ofjudicial line drawing after the competing interests are weighed.
The Texas courts have taken the stance that the Act is frustrated when employers
offer lower benefits under employer-created plans than are provided by the Act.' 94
Attempts by employers to circumvent the state's workers' compensation system are
negatively compounded when the benefits offered under such a plan are inferior to
185. Id. at 22.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Primm, supra note 2, at 166.
189. Primm, supra note 2, at 166.
190. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
191. Id. at 725.
192. Cupit, 90 F.3d at 109. See also Cline, 79 F. Supp. 2d 735.
193. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 725-26. See also Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 729.
194. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 725-26. See also Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 729.
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the state's scheme. Even though there are numerous benefits, to both employers and
employees, to enforcing an arms-length transaction that requires disputes to be
submitted to an arbitral forum, the overriding concern is the inadequate benefits
being provided. This overriding concern outweighs the voluntariness promoted by
contract principles, and for this reason, the Strawn court correctly found the AFC
Plan void as against Texas public policy.' 95
VI. CONCLUSION
The Strawn case illustrates that courts have the power to enforce laws as
intended by the legislature. When employers attempt to circumvent the legislative
process, courts must act to prevent such thwarting and ensure that the laws are
applied as contemplated. When the legislature deems it necessary to level the
playing field regarding the bargaining power of an employer and its employees,
courts will not allow employers to nullify the effect of such laws by opting not to
participate. Rather, if employers choose not to participate in the states' workers'
compensation programs, but instead opt to create their own employee compensation
plans, such plans must offer at least equal to or greater benefits than offered under
workers' compensation. This appears to be the case even if such employer-created
plans include an agreed upon provision submitting all employer-employee disputes
to an arbitral forum. While there is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration,
courts will not allow employers to manipulate this strong favor to help them tilt the
balance back their way. If employers' plans do not offer at least equal benefits to
employees as would be received under the state's workers' compensation system,
they run the risk of courts voiding their self-created agreements as contrary to the
states' public policy underlying workers' compensation programs.
NATHAN E. Ross
195. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 726-28.
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